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Abstract
In this paper, I examine the extent to which the concrete and lived experiences of, and 
understanding of the world by, African women in indigenous African spaces are seriously 
taken into consideration and put in focus in the last few decades of largely academic, stand­
point African feminist discourses. I argue that indigenous (traditional) African feminist per­
spective of the world has been mostly fractured by a subtle standpoint feminist epistemology 
that is Western, colonial and theoretically oppressive. African feminists are wont to analyse 
feminist issues in African spaces (both at home and in the Diaspora) from this Western and 
colonial standpoint as a superior vantage perspective of women’s experiences. I question 
this point by focussing specifically on an African indigenous feminist moral epistemology of 
care. I argue that the modern feminist discourse on this subject is fractured by the Western 
and colonial standpoint and largely ignores the traditional African women’s perspective of 
the subject. While the traditional African women’s theory of knowledge of care consists of a 
cherished moral duty to care for and nurture the human society, the modern African feminist 
standpoint views such moral duty as mostly oppressive and discriminating against women. 
In this regard, I shift focus from the Western­influenced African standpoint feminism to 
explore a problem that may not yet be receiving much attention in the quest to protect the 
dignity and wellbeing of African women, patriarchal opportunism. I conclude that key femi­
nist issues in African spaces such as racism, colonialism, social and economic equality and 
sexuality ought to be approached from the perspective of the concrete and lived experiences 
of African women for authentic, unfractured knowledge to emerge.
Keywords
African	feminism,	epistemology	of	care,	standpoint	feminism,	African	women,	patriarchal	
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Introduction: 
The Ambiguity of African Feminism
Frankly	 speaking,	 for	 the	 past	 seven	 or	 so	 decades,	African	 feminism	 has	
been	beclouded	with	conceptual	and	teleological	ambiguities	and	complexi-
ties	perhaps	because	the	very	conceptualisation	–	the	very	merger	of	the	West-
ern	categorical	concept	‘feminism’	with	the	concept	‘African’	–	immediately	
raises	 suspicion	about	 the	extent	 to	which	 such	a	conceptualisation	 further	
perpetuates	 the	colonisation	of	 thought	 that	 it	 is	partly	 intended	in	 the	first	
place	 to	 overcome	 and	 the	 extent	 to	which	 such	 conceptualisation	 engulfs	
the	lived	experiences	of	African	women.	Thus,	in	a	sense,	there	seems	to	be	
a	Western	hegemonic	influence	on	feminism	across	spaces,	African	or	non-
African.	Gwendolyn	Mikell	 rightly	 recognises	 this	 factor	 and	 two	other	as	
responsible	for	the	ambiguities	surrounding	the	rise	and	development	of	Af-
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rican	feminism.1	Concerning	the	issue	of	hegemony,	she	explains	that	there	
was	always	the	uneasiness	felt	by	women	in	African	spaces	 that	 they	were	
being	co-opted	by	Western	feminist	academics	into	a	movement	defined	by	
extreme	individualism,	by	militant	opposition	 to	patriarchy,	and	ultimately,	
by	a	hostility	to	males,	attitude	that	was	contradictory	to	the	core	values	of	
African	women.2
A	second	 interrelated	 factor	 recognised	by	Mikell	 is	 that	African	women’s	
movements	 in	 these	decades	were	mostly	 an	 extension	of	women’s	move-
ments	 in	 the	West,	often	having	the	same	telos.3	Although	there	have	been	
arguments	in	some	quarters	that	the	goals	are	different,	arguments	that	Mikell	
favours,4	these	are	arguments	that	may	be	difficult	to	sustain.	For	example,	
the	quest	for	more	active	and	visible	presence	of	women	in	politics	and	equal	
employment	opportunities	for	women	as	for	men	that	were	championed	by	
Western	women’s	movements	were	 also	 championed	 by	African	women’s	
movements	with	 the	 same	 impetus	and	strategies.	A	 look	at	 the	Charter	of	
Feminist	 Principles	 for	African	 Feminists	 developed	 by	 the	African	 Femi-
nist	Forum	(AFF)	in	a	meeting	in	2006	in	Ghana	and	hosted	by	the	African	
Women	Development	Fund	clearly	shows	that	African	feminism	is	mostly	an	
extension	of	feminism	in	the	West.	For	instance,	the	Charter	says:
“Patriarchy	is	a	system	of	male	authority	which	legitimises	the	oppression	of	women	through	
political,	social,	economic	and	legal,	cultural,	religious	and	military	institutions.	Men’s	access	
to	and	control	over	resources	and	rewards	within	the	private	and	public	sphere	derives	its	le-
gitimacy	from	the	patriarchal	ideology	of	male	dominance.	Our	understanding	of	Patriarchy	is	
crucial	because	it	provides	us	as	feminists,	a	framework	within	which	to	express	the	totality	of	
oppressive	and	exploitative	relations	which	affect	African	women.”5
This	understanding	of	patriarchy	is	no	doubt	influenced	by	the	Western	un-
derstanding	of	patriarchy.	The	African	understanding	of	patriarchy,	while	reco-
gnising	the	problems	associated	with	it	such	as	the	negative	effects	of	male	
dominance	 on	 women,	 holds	 that	 patriarchy	 is	 not	 essentially	 oppressive.	
Hence,	it	becomes	difficult	for	some	important	figures	in	the	history	of	Afri-
can	feminism	to	wear	the	tag	‘feminist’	as	the	label	seems	to	drift	away	from	
the	core	African	values	they	hold	dear.	When	Florence	Onyebuchi	Emecheta,	
who	many	would	proudly	refer	to	in	academics	as	a	thorough-going	African	
feminist	due	to	her	novel	works	in	this	sphere	of	discourse,6	was	asked	if	she	
was	a(n)	(African)	feminist,	her	response	was:
“I	have	never	called	myself	a	feminist.	Now	if	you	choose	to	call	me	a	feminist,	that	is	your	
business;	but	I	don’t	subscribe	to	the	feminist	idea	that	all	men	are	brutal	and	repressive	and	
we	must	reject	them.	Some	of	these	men	are	my	brothers	and	fathers	and	sons.	Am	I	to	reject	
them	too?”7
The	third	reason	highlighted	by	Mikell	in	explaining	the	challenges	that	Af-
rican	feminism	has	faced	is	the	problem	of	a	perceived	dichotomy	between	
what	mainstream	African	 feminist	 academics	put	 forward	as	African	 femi-
nism	and	what	rural	ordinary	African	women	would	posit,	making	the	former	
refer	to	the	latter	as	parochial	and	prefeminist.	This	at	once	leads	to	class	dif-
ference	and	perpetuates	the	circle	of	oppression	that	African	feminists	hope	
to	overcome.8	The	dichotomy	is	once	again	caused	by	the	gap	between	West-
ern-trained	African	women	and	African	women	who	hold	dear	many	of	the	
values	that	women	from	the	Universities	would	quickly	question.	Once	again,	
the	hegemonic	 influence	creeps	 in.	Hence	as	Desiree	Lewis	simply	puts	 it,	
“‘African	Feminism’	 embraces	 the	work	 of	 theorists	 located	 in	 the	United	
States’”.9
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Notwithstanding	 these	 challenges,	 African	 feminism	 has	 risen	 and	 come	
to	 stay.	What	 must	 persist	 after	 its	 coming	 to	 being	 is	 the	 shaping	 of	 its	
ideology(ies)	to	continually	reflect	the	African	women’s	understanding	of	re-
ality	and	their	wellbeing.	In	the	words	of	Amina	Mama:
“Feminism	signals	a	refusal	of	oppression,	and	a	commitment	to	struggling	for	women’s	libera-
tion	from	all	forms	of	oppression	[and	I	believe	this	includes	ideological	oppression	even	by	fel-
low	women],	–	internal,	external,	psychological	and	emotional,	political	and	philosophical.”10
Bearing	this	in	mind,	African	feminism	is	the	struggle	against	the	oppression	
of,	and	the	struggle	for	 the	liberation	of,	African	women	from	all	forms	of	
oppression,	 physical,	mental	 or	 theoretical.	The	 fight	 against	 physical	 and	
mental	oppression	has,	I	believe,	been	at	the	forefront	of	this	struggle,	while	
the	 theoretical	 remains	 in	 the	background.	 If	 the	 task	of	African	 feminism	
must	be	achieved	and	the	concrete	and	lived	experiences	of	African	women	
put	in	focus,	the	theoretical	oppression	must	be	brought	to	the	foreground	and	
tackled	decisively.	The	discussion	that	ensues	henceforth	emerges	from	this	
angle	of	African	feminist	concerns.
It	seems	to	me	that	 indigenous	(traditional)	African	feminist	perspective	of	
the	world	has	been	mostly	fractured,	suppressed	and	by	implication	ignored	
by	a	subtle	standpoint	 feminist	epistemology	that	 is	both	Western,	colonial	
and	theoretically	oppressive.	Many	academic	African	feminists	are	wont	to	
analyse	feminist	issues	in	African	spaces	(both	at	home	and	in	the	Diaspora)	
from	this	Western	and	colonial	standpoint	as	a	superior	vantage	perspective	
of	women’s	experiences.	I	buttress	this	point	by	focussing	specifically	on	an	
African	indigenous	feminist	moral	epistemology	of	care.	I	argue	that	the	mod-
ern	feminist	discourse	on	this	subject	is	fractured	by	the	Western	and	colo-
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nial	standpoint	and	ignores	the	traditional	African	women’s	perspective	of	the	
subject	largely.	While	the	traditional	African	women’s	theory	of	knowledge	
of	care	consists	of	a	cherished	moral	duty	of	care	and	nurture	of	the	human	
society,	the	modern	African	feminist	standpoint	views	such	moral	duty	as	op-
pressive	and	discriminating	against	women.	To	develop	this	line	of	thought,	I	
begin	with	an	exposition	of	what	I	mean	with	a	moral	epistemology	of	care.	
I	then	proceed	to	examine	how	care	is	an	essential	feminist	agenda	in	tradi-
tional	African	societies	and	how	this	feminist	agenda	has	been	fractured	in	
modernity.	In	the	third	section,	I	proceed	to	examine	what	I	believe	ought	to	
be	the	major	challenge	to	the	African	feminist	care	agenda,	patriarchal	oppor-
tunism	and	why	it	is	essential	for	an	African	feminist	to	critique	it	and	stand	
against	it	both	theoretically	and	practically.	Drawing	from	these	analyses,	I	
conclude	that	key	feminist	issues	in	African	spaces	such	as	racism,	colonial-
ism,	social	and	economic	equality	and	sexuality	ought	to	be	approached	from	
the	perspective	of	the	concrete	and	lived	experiences	of	African	women	for	
authentic,	unfractured	knowledge	to	emerge.
A Moral Epistemology of Care
An	epistemology	of	care	 is	a	 theory	of	knowledge	about	care	and	care	 re-
lations.	 It	makes	certain	knowledge	claims	about	what	caring	 is	 about	and	
how	it	should	be	done.	An	epistemology	of	care	at	the	very	least	thus	implies	
knowing	how	to	care	even	when	one	does	not	act	by	that	knowledge.	Suppose	
James	knows	that	to	care	for	his	frail	elderly	mother	is	to	dox	andy	and	this	
means	that	he	should	provide	for	her	material	needs	in	a	way	that	lovingly	
recognises	and	protects	her	autonomy	and	dignity.	But	James,	although	know-
ing	this,	fails	to	provide	such	care	for	his	mother.	Could	James	be	said	not	to	
know	or	not	to	act?	Certainly	James	can	be	said	to	know,	but	not	to	act	on	
what	he	knows.	James	is	a	knower	about	care,	but	not	a	moral	knower	about	
care.	Hence,	an	epistemology	of	care	does	not	necessarily	translate	into	ac-
tion.	But	what	I	term	here	as	a	moral	epistemology	of	care	does.
A	moral	epistemology	of	care	is	thus	a	theory	of	knowledge	about	care	and	
care	relations	that	translates	into	action	or	forms	the	basis	for	the	knower’s	
actions	in	terms	of	care	relations.	In	other	words,	the	knower	does	not	sim-
ply	know,	but	his	knowledge	translates	into	action.	James	would	be	a	moral	
knower	about	care	when	he	does	not	only	know	about	what	care	entails	for	
the	elderly	such	as	his	frail	elderly	mother	but	also	acts	on	what	he	knows.	A	
care-demanding	situation	may	lead	to	several	moral	epistemologies	of	care.	
Consider	the	following	scenario.	James	and	Ellen	just	had	a	baby	boy.	James	
subscribes	to	and	acts	on	the	theory	of	knowledge	about	care	which	consists	of	
the	claim	that	inflicting	pain	may	sometimes	be	necessary	for	a	greater	good	
to	be	accomplished.	Ellen	however	subscribes	and	acts	on	a	contrary	theory	
of	knowledge	which	holds	that	on	no	circumstance	of	care	relations	should	
we	inflict	pain	on	another.	The	nurse	at	the	hospital	suggests	to	the	couple	to	
circumcise	the	boy.	Now,	the	couple	is	faced	with	a	moral	dilemma	because	
they	hold	tenaciously	to	different	moral	epistemologies	of	care.	James	may	be	
willing	to	support	circumcision	for	their	son,	but	Ellen	would	not	be	willing.	
And	this	tells	us	what	happens	in	the	larger	picture.	We	are	often	wont	to	think	
that	we	all	act	on	the	same	epistemology	of	care.
For	this	reason,	when	the	other	fails	to	respond	the	same	way	we	do	to	a	care-
demanding	situation,	we	are	quick	to	find	faults	with	her	process	of	evaluation	
of	care.	Existing	literature	shows	multifaceted	theories	of	knowledge	about	
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care.	To	buttress	this	point,	I	will	quickly	look	at	three	different	perspectives	
that	have	emerged	quite	recently	from	Western	feminist	discourse	about	care:	
Nel	Noddings’s	theory,11	Vrinda	Dalmiya’s	theory,12	and	Eva	Feder	Kittay’s	
theory.13
Noddings’s	 epistemic	 theory	of	 care	 is	 central	 to	 the	 feminist	 discourse	of	
care	that	has	ensued	in	the	last	three	decades.	Her	theory	has	as	its	focal	point	
interpersonal	care	or	cares	for	the	other.	Of	course,	we	recall	a	famous	line	
from	her	classic:
“One	caring	receives	the	other	for	the	interval	of	caring,	completely	and	nonselectively.”14
As	Dalmiya	explains,	Noddings’s	theory	consists	of
“…	a	dyadic	relation	between	an	ordered	pair	of	individuals	called	respectively,	the	‘one-caring’	
and	the	‘cared-for’	(…)	caring	involves	three	features:	(1)	a	motivational	displacement	(of	the	
one-caring	on	the	cared-for),	(2)	a	conative	component	or	efforts	of	the	one-caring	to	further	
the	well-being	of	the	cared-for,	and	(3)	an	acknowledgement	of	these	efforts	by	the	cared-for.	
However,	the	diversity	of	care	locutions	in	ordinary	language	–	for	example,	x	cares	about	y,	x	
cares	for	y,	x	takes	care	of	y,	and	the	unrelated	cluster	of	uses	as	in	x	has	cares,	and	x	is	careful	
–	a	gesture	towards	a	more	textured	articulation	of	the	logic	of	care.”15
Dalmiya,	therefore,	proceeds	to	propose	her	theory	of	care	which	consists	of	
five	key	features	that	must	be	present	for	care	to	take	place.	In	her	words:
“A	relationship	that	creates	space	both	for	the	one-caring	and	for	the	cared-for,	along	with	their	
differences,	is	sustained	by	a	five-faceted	process	of	caring about, caring for, taking care, care 
reception and caring about caring.	The	usual	objections	 in	 the	 literature	against	 the	concept	
of	care	–	that	caring	erases	difference,	that	it	isolates	the	caregiver	from	society	and	makes	the	
well-being	of	the	cared-for	an	individual	responsibility,	that	it	degenerates	into	an	arrogant	pa-
ternalism	or	self-sacrifice	–	are	due	to	equivocations	identifying	care	with	only	one	or	some	of	
these	facets	[rather	than	all	the	facets].”16
Eva	Feder	Kittay,	on	the	other	hand,	provides	an	interesting	yet	interrelated	
theory	of	caring	to	those	above.	As	she	explains,	care	can	denote	three	inter-
related	things:	labour,	an	attitude,	or	a	virtue.	As	labour,	it	is	the	duty	of	main-
taining	others	and	ourselves	when	we	are	in	a	condition	of	need.	It	requires	
skills	 on	 the	part	 of	 the	 caregiver	 and	uptake	on	 the	part	 of	 the	one	 cared	
for.	It	is	most	noticed	in	its	absence;	most	appreciated	when	it	could	be	least	
reciprocated.	As	an	attitude,	caring	denotes	a	positive,	affective	bond	and	in-
vestment	in	another’s	wellbeing.	The	labour	can	be	without	the	appropriate	
attitude.	Without	the	attitude	of	care,	the	open	responsiveness	to	another	that	
is	so	essential	to	understanding	what	another	requires	is	not	possible.	That	is,	
the	labour	unaccompanied	by	the	attitude	of	care	will	not	be	good	care.	Care,	
as	a	virtue,	is	a	disposition	manifested	in	caring	behaviour	(the	labour	and	at-
11
See:	Nel	Noddings,	Caring:	A Feminine Ap­
proach to Ethics and Moral Education,	Uni-
versity	of	California	Press,	Berkeley	1984.
12
See:	Vrinda	Dalmiya,	“Why	Should	a	Knower	
Care?”,	Hypatia	17	(2002)	1,	pp.	34–52,	doi:	
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1527–2001.2002.
tb00678.x.
13
See:	Eva	Feder	Kittay,	“The	Ethics	of	Care,	
Dependence	 and	 Disability”,	 Ratio Juris: 
An International Journal of Jurisprudence 
and Philosophy of Law	 24	 (2011)	 1,	 pp.	
52–53,	 doi:	 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467–
9337.2010.00473.x.
14
N.	Noddings,	Caring,	p.	176.
15
V.	Dalmiya,	“Why	Should	a	Knower	Care?”,	
p.	35.
16
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titude)	in	which	a	shift	takes	place	from	the	interest	in	our	life	situation	to	the	
situation	of	the	other,	the	one	in	need	of	care.	Relations	of	affection	facilitate	
care,	but	the	disposition	can	be	directed	at	strangers	as	well	as	intimates.17
Therefore,	 various	 theories	 about	what	 care	 involve	 exist.	 They	 lay	 claim	
to	holding	some	sort	of	knowledge	about	what	care	is.	No	single	epistemic	
theory	of	care	can	lay	claim	to	a	God’s	eye	view	on	the	matter.	The	theory	of	
knowledge	about	what	care	is	seems	to	me	to	evolve	from	specific	contexts,	
social	constructs	and	spaces.	Thus,	when	a	Western	feminist	examines	African	
women’s	understanding	of	care	from	her	epistemic	lenses,	she	is	bound	to	ex-
perience	difficulties	and	misjudge	matters.	In	what	follows,	I	attempt	a	rather	
difficult	task	of	presenting	in	as	clear	terms	as	possible	the	indigenous	African	
feminist	moral	epistemology	of	care.	I	rely	heavily	on	the	everyday	lived	ex-
periences	of	women	in	African	communities	such	as	my	firsthand	experiences	
of	mother,	sisters,	wife,	daughters	and	female	relatives	and	friends.
A Traditional African Feminist Moral 
Epistemology of Care and the Modern Fracturing
African	traditional	(or	should	I	say	indigenous	or	pre-colonial)	feminist	epis-
temology,	first	of	all,	is	the	body	of	knowledge	held,	produced,	sustained,	pre-
sented	and	represented	through	history	by	African	women	in	African	spaces,	
and	then	it	stands	for	all	forms	of	the	critique	of,	and	resistance	against,	other	
forms	 of	 knowledge	 and	 justificatory	 practices	 (mainly	 androcentric)	 that	
threaten	the	wellbeing	and	dignity	of	African	women.	By	implication,	a	tradi-
tional	African	epistemology	of	care	consists	of	the	body	of	knowledge	about	
caring	that	African	women	hold,	cherish,	preserve	and	(re)present	in	African	
societies.	It	also	consists	of	a	critique	of	threats	to	such	a	body	of	knowledge	
about	caring.	Elizabeth	Anderson’s	description	of	feminist	epistemology	(and	
philosophy	of	science)	is	crucial	here.	Anderson	explains	that	feminist	epis-
temology	“studies	how	gender	does	and	ought	to	influence	our	conception	of	
knowledge,	the	knowing	subject	and	practices	of	inquiry	and	justification”.18	
She	adds	that	feminist	epistemology	also
“…	identifies	ways	in	which	dominant	conceptions	and	practices	of	knowledge	attribution,	acquisi-
tion	and	justification	systematically	disadvantage	women	and	other	subordinated	groups,	and	strives	
to	reform	these	conceptions	and	practices	so	that	they	serve	the	interest	of	these	groups.”19
Hence	an	African	indigenous	epistemology	of	care	examines	how	being	an	
African	woman	influences	conceptions	of	care	held	by	the	knowing	subject,	
the	African	woman.
The	traditional	African	epistemology	of	care	is	a	moral	epistemology	of	care	
because	African	women	do	not	only	have	a	body	or	knowledge	about	caring	
nor	do	 they	simply	 influence	conceptions	of	care	 in	 their	particular	worlds	
due	to	their	uniqueness	as	women,	but	they	act	on	and	live	by	the	knowledge	
of	care	 that	 they	hold	and	preserve.	African	women	who	 fail	 to	act	by	 the	
feminine	understanding	of	care	even	while	having	understanding	are	seen	as	
failing	in	a	moral	duty	to	care,	a	duty	saw	not	only	as	moral	but	ontological	
because	it	is	understood	as	part	of	the	very	being	of	women	to	care	in	such	and	
such	ways.	Thus,	an	authentic	African	moral	epistemology	of	care	involves	
three	interwoven	facets	of	knowing,	acting	and	transmitting	what	is	known	to	
the	younger	generation.
What	constitutes	 the	body	of	 the	knowledge	of	care	 for	 traditional	African	
women?	Here,	 I	will	 explore	 two	 epistemic	 levels	 of	 care	 for	 the	African	
woman.	The	first	is	interpersonal	care	and	the	second	aesthetic	self-care.	Each	
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level	is	constituted	by	knowing,	acting	and	transmitting	of	knowledge.	At	the	
interpersonal	level,	the	African	feminine	conception	of	care	revolves	around	
the	 concept	 of	motherhood	 understood	 strictly	 as	maternal	 tenderness	 and	
affection	toward	the	one	cared-for.	It	involves	an	ontic	drive	to	promote	the	
wellbeing	of	the	one	cared-for.	African	women	instinctively	and	intuitively	
know	that	they	are	mothers;	they	act	and	consistently	work	toward	fulfilling	
their	motherly	roles	and	train	younger	females	on	how	to	do	so.	It	 is	often	
assumed	that	motherhood	for	African	women	is	directed	only	 to	biological	
children.20	But	this	is	not	peculiarly	African.	A	careful	observation	of	women	
in	African	 communities	will	 reveal	 that	 this	 is	 only	 a	 part	 of	 the	 essential	
responsibility	of	motherhood.	An	African	mother	is	not	only	a	mother	to	her	
children,	 but	 to	 her	 brothers,	 sisters,	 father,	mother,	 friends,	 relatives,	 and	
even	 the	environment.	Her	maternal	 tenderness	and	affection	and	 the	ontic	
drive	to	promote	wellbeing	is	extended	to	the	whole	community,	both	human	
and	non-human.	Anyone	that	has	lived	for	a	while	in	an	African	community	
would	observe	daily	the	role	of	women	for	the	sustenance	of	life	and	wellbe-
ing	of	their	children,	friends,	family	members,	relatives,	plants	and	the	envi-
ronment	at	large.	This	is	a	hectic	responsibility	of	interpersonal	care,	but	the	
African	woman	knows	with	certainty	that	if	she	fails	in	her	duty	to	do	so	or	at	
least	lead	the	way	for	others	(both	males	and	females)	in	doing	so,	the	society	
would	 fall	 apart.	 Indeed,	 no	African	 society	 survives	without	 the	maternal	
tenderness	and	affection	of	the	women	within	such	a	society.	From	caring	for	
the	new-born,	raising	children	to	becoming	responsible	community	members,	
preparing	nourishing	and	healthy	meals	for	family	members,	being	a	shoul-
der	to	lean	on	by	fellow	sisters,	spouse,	and	other	community	members,	 to	
cultivating	the	earth	and	keeping	the	environment	neat	and	tidy,	the	African	
woman	dutifully	cares	for	her	community.	Simply	put,	they	may	not	be	the	
loud	vessels,	but	women	organise	and	sustain	the	African	society.21
The	moral	duty	to	care	for	the	society	in	this	way	is	not	seen	by	the	African	
woman	as	an	imposed	duty.	She	knows	it	 is	her	duty	and	she	takes	 it	very	
seriously.	 It	 is	 a	 life-building	 and	 life-saving	 care	 that	 leads	 to	 self-fulfill-
ment	for	the	woman	involved.	Hence	a	woman	who	ignores	this	duty	or	de-
liberately	shies	away	from	this	duty	of	care	is	easily	spotted	and	scolded	by	
fellow	women	 in	 the	community.	The	ease	 to	notice	such	a	woman	results	
from	the	fact	that	her	irresponsibility	toward	caring	for	others	becomes	vivid	
in	her	family	members	and	the	environment	in	which	she	lives.	Her	children	
may	 look	unkempt,	 her	 husband	 and	 children	may	 look	malnourished,	 her	
compound	may	look	untidy,	her	children	may	lack	the	epistemic	competence	
to	care	as	well	as	she	may	have	failed	in	her	duty	to	transmit	her	knowledge,	
and	she	may	become	difficult	to	lean	on	by	other	members	of	the	community	
in	times	of	distress.	Hence	the	failure	to	act	on	the	epistemic	competence	to	
17
See:	E.	F.	Kittay,	 “The	Ethics	 of	Care”,	 pp.	
52–53.	Cf.	Elvis	 Imafidon,	African Philoso­
phy and the Otherness of Albinism: White 
Skin, Black Race,	Routledge,	 London	 2018,	
chpt.	4.
18
Elizabeth	S.	Anderson,	“Feminist	Epistemol-
ogy	and	Philosophy	of	Science”,	in:	Edward	
N.	Zaha	(ed.),	The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy.	 Available	 at:	 https://plato.stan-
ford.edu/entries/feminism-epistemology/	(ac-
cessed	on	April	10,	2018).
19
Ibid.
20
Cf.,	 for	 example,	 Fainos	 Mangena,	 “The	
Search	for	an	African	Feminist	Ethic:	A	Zim-
babwean	 Perspective”, Journal of Interna­
tional Women’s Studies	11	(2009)	2,	pp.	18–30,	
pp.	25–26.
21
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care	by	a	single	African	woman	can	cause	great	harm	for	some	persons	in	the	
community.	Women,	therefore,	occupy	a	crucial	place	in	the	wellbeing	and	
survival	of	an	African	community.
Beyond	the	knowledge	of	care	and	the	moral	responsibility	that	ensues	from	
such	knowledge,	African	women	as	part	of	 the	strategy	to	care	beyond	the	
now	 and	 for	 future	 generations	 represent	 and	 transmit	 their	 understanding	
of	care	to	their	children	in	particular	and	younger	ones	in	the	community	in	
general.	It	is	important	to	note	that	this	training	is	not	particularly	given	to	
females	alone,	but	 also	males.	 I	grew	up	 in	an	African	home	with	African	
parents.	My	mother	 took	 it	as	a	very	 important	duty	 to	raise	her	four	boys	
and	three	girls	to	imbibe	the	knowledge	of	care.	Everyone	in	the	house	had	a	
labour/training	routine.	On	the	days	I	sweep	the	compound	and	keep	it	clean,	
I	do	not	clean	indoors,	or	cook;	on	the	days	I	join	in	the	kitchen	chores	such	
as	washing	dishes	or	cleaning	kitchen	utensils,	I	do	not	clean	the	compound	or	
mop	the	floors;	we	all	knew	what	we	had	to	do	on	specific	days	of	the	week.	
Thus	whether	male	or	female,	you	learn	how	to	cook,	clean,	care	for	younger	
ones,	etc.	But	as	my	sisters	grew	particularly	in	their	late	teens	and	early	adult	
years,	they	received	close	intimate	training	from	my	mother	on	how	to	raise	a	
family,	basically	how	to	do	what	she	was	doing:	how	to	be	a	mother,	a	tender	
and	affectionate	woman	particularly	when	they	get	married.	This	same	sce-
nario	could	be	observed	in	many	other	homes	in	the	community	where	I	lived.	
Many	have	fractured	this	role	of	training	by	claiming	that	only	the	females	
were	trained	this	way	at	home	and	the	males	were	taught	to	do	nothing.	In	
fact,	females	were	always	taught	to	remember	that	the	boys	should	not	come	
into	the	kitchen	or	do	any	house	chores.	But	we	need	to	be	careful	not	to	con-
fuse	 indigenous	African	practices	with	 long-standing	colonial	practices.	As	
Rabah	Omer	rightly	argues,22	many	of	what	we	now	claim	to	be	indigenous	
or	traditional	beliefs	and	practices	are	part	of	the	colonial	heritage.	Comment-
ing	on	how	colonialism	fractured	African	women’s	morality,	Omer	explains,	
citing	Hendrickson23	and	using	Zimbabwe	as	an	example:
“Colonialism	addressed	African	women’s	morality	also	through	gender	roles.	Domesticity	was	
promoted	as	a	method	of	‘civilising’	women.	Traditionally	African	women	worked	[with	men	
and	children]	 in	 the	 fields	cultivating	crops	and	processing	diaries.	Missionaries	 trained	and	
supervised	the	‘Jeames’	teachers	–	female	home	demonstrators.	They	were	funded	by	the	colo-
nial	state	during	the	1930s	through	1970s	to	train	Zimbabwean	women	around	the	country	on	
‘modernising’	concepts	of	domesticity.”24
Thus,	traditionally,	these	domestic	roles	were	not	as	gendered	as	they	are	to-
day.	Admittedly,	there	were	domestic	roles	that	were	almost	strictly	reserved	
for	females	in	African	traditions	such	as	caring	for	a	newborn	and	cooking,	
but	certainly	not	all	domestic	roles	as	is	often	claimed	in	Western	literature.	
Such	fracturing	is	also	obvious	in	the	second	level	of	care.
Traditionally,	the	African	woman	places	high	importance	on	aesthetic	self-care.	
The	care	for	the	beauty	of	her	entire	body	is	paramount.	This	is	the	level	where	
she	does	to	herself	what	she	continually	does	for	others.	The	beautiful	braiding	
of	her	hair,	the	seductive	dressing	of	single	females	that	often	covers	only	their	
private	parts,	the	aesthetic	designs	and	drawings	on	their	bodies	are	some	of	
the	ways	they	show	how	much	they	value	their	bodies	and	care	for	them.	But	
the	colonial	masters	saw	this	as	barbaric,	leading	to	the	fracturing	of	aesthetic	
self-care.	It	became	a	major	task	of	colonialism	to	cover	the	‘nakedness’	of	the	
‘savage’	through	agents	of	religion	and	politics.	In	the	words	of	Omer:
“The	colonial	conquest	created	socio-political	systems	in	which	African	people	were	forced	to	
convert	to	Christianity	and	to	wear	Western	styles	of	dress.	Clothing	‘the	natives’	was	a	central	
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focus	of	the	colonial	missionary	project	in	Africa.	In	Bechuanaland,	a	frontier	region	between	
colonial	Botswana	 and	South	Africa,	 the	 process	 of	moralization	 required	 dressing	Africans	
in	European	clothes	‘to	cover	their	nakedness’	and	control	 their	bodies	through	new	hygiene	
methods.”25
It	is	therefore	interesting	to	see	that	in	recent	times,	in	the	last	two	to	three	
decades,	the	same	West	through	its	feminist	activists	and	scholars	now	advo-
cates	sexual,	clothing	and	general	lifestyle	freedom	for	females.	We	hear	of	
feminists	going	topless	on	the	street	to	advocate	their	rights	to	bodily	and	sex-
ual	freedom,	rights	to	care	for	themselves	the	way	they	deem	fit	rather	than	
in	ways	that	are	domineering.	But	this	were	the	same	rights	African	women	
already	enjoyed	without	issues	in	traditional	societies	and	these	rights	were	
taken	from	them	by	the	colonial	West,	by	fracturing	their	epistemic	base	and	
seeking	to	dominate	them	with	religion	and	politics.	Does	the	West	now	have	
the	moral	right	to	champion	what	they	once	condemned	and	compelled	others	
to	abandon	 in	an	age	 ruled	by	Western	authoritarian	 religious	and	political	
agents?
Hence,	in	several	ways,	these	two	levels	of	the	African	feminist	moral	epis-
temology	of	care	have	been	fractured	by	Western	supremacist,	domineering	
scholarship	about	African	women.	Many	young	African	women	today	who	
have	been	tutored	in	the	Western	line	of	thought	view	the	first	level	of	care	
as	androcentric,	domineering	and	cruel	to	the	female	folk	and	see	the	second	
level	of	care	as	barbaric	just	as	the	West	once	presented	it	–	while	ironically	
accepting	the	modern	yet	similar	seductive	fashion	and	body	makeup	of	the	
West	 as	 fashionable	 and	 liberating.	 Consequently,	modern	African	 society	
suffers	 and	 the	 successful	 passage	 of	 the	 body	 of	 knowledge	 of	 caring	 by	
the	older	African	women	to	the	younger	is	hindered.	The	blows	of	‘modern’	
African	women,	it	seems	to	me,	are	directed	at	the	wrong	issue,	the	values	
that	sustain	the	society	rather	than	vices	that	may	threaten	such	values.	I	now	
turn	to	explore	a	major	threat	to	the	African	feminist	moral	epistemology	of	
care	that	I	strongly	feel	should	receive	more	attention,	a	critique	of	patriarchal	
opportunism.
A Critique of Patriarchal Opportunism
In	human	relations,	people	often	take	advantage	of	situations.	Some	persons	
lie	to	get	more	benefits	from	the	state	simply	because	the	state	offers	benefits	
in	the	first	place.	Some	have	decided	to	have	more	children	because	doing	so	
would	reduce	state	taxing.	People	are	often	opportunist,	leading	to	the	exist-
ence	of	more	parasitic	relationships	than	reciprocal,	mutual	relationships.	It	
is	 on	 this	 premise	 that	 I	 theorise	 about	 patriarchal	 opportunism	 in	African	
societies.	By	patriarchal	opportunism,	I	mean	the	act	of	taking	advantage	of,	
and	exploiting,	the	inherent	quality	of,	or	ability	to,	care,	the	maternal	tender-
22
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ness	and	affection	of	African	women	by	African	men.	Patriarchal	opportun-
ism,	therefore,	begins	with	the	recognition	of	African	women	as	the	pillar	of	
care	and	wellbeing	of	the	African	community	and	then	proceeds	for	several	
reasons	to	the	exploitation	of	this	ontological	fact	about	African	women	in	a	
manner	that	is	draining,	demeaning	and	abusive	to	African	women.
Two	 reasons	 come	 to	mind	why	men	 do	 this.	 First,	 to	 assert	 a	 patriarchal	
headship	and	ego	that	seems	to	be	threatened	by	the	obvious	strength	of	care	
of	the	African	woman.	We	can	illustrate	this	by	paying	attention	to	the	nu-
cleus	of	the	society,	 the	family.	In	the	African	family,	 the	woman	cares	for	
all	family	members.	For	instance,	the	children	know	that	if	they	need	to	eat	
or	care	for	other	domestic	needs,	it	is	their	mother	they	need	to	reach	out	to.	
In	most	cases,	even	when	it	comes	 to	financial	needs,	 the	children	may	be	
more	comfortable	to	ask	their	mother	to	speak	on	their	behalf	to	their	father;	
a	better	result	may	be	achieved	this	way.	In	all	of	these	exchanges	of	familial	
relationships,	the	man,	who	is	the	head	of	the	family	by	social	arrangement,	
strives	consistently	to	make	it	clear	to	all	family	members	that	he	is	the	one	
in	charge	even	if	they	may	get	more	affection	and	tenderness	from	the	mother	
of	the	house.	It	is	almost	as	if	he	is	threatened	by	the	qualities	of	his	wife	that	
he	has	to	protect	his	position	as	the	head	defensively.	The	truth	remains	that	
after	all	the	assertion	of	headship	by	the	man,	the	children	grow	up	mostly	to	
be	more	close	to,	and	fond	of,	their	mother.	I	read	a	funny,	but	interesting	post	
recently	online	about	why	African	men	need	to	make	plans	to	sustain	them-
selves	materially	in	their	old	age.	The	point	made	in	the	post	was	that	when	
children	grow	up,	they	care	more	for	their	mother	than	their	father	and	so,	if	
a	father	hopes	to	depend	on	his	children	in	his	old	age,	he	will	most	likely	be	
disappointed.	As	funny	as	this	may	sound,	I	have	personally	experienced	this	
in	many	homes	in	African	societies.	The	lasting	effect	of	 the	care	received	
by	the	children	from	their	mother	–	from	the	point	of	conception,	childbirth,	
to	growing	up	–	always	endears	them	to	their	mother.	It	shows	that	quality	
would	always	be	more	valued	than	quantity	when	it	comes	to	caring.	Even	
if	an	African	man	was	fully	financially	responsible	during	the	conception	to	
the	birth	of	a	child,	what	stands	out,	what	African	women	emphasise	and	Af-
rican	children	remember	is	this:	‘my	mum	carried	me	in	her	womb	for	nine	
months’.	Hence,	the	assertion	of	headship	by	men	as	a	response	to	the	alleged	
threat	from	women	is	self-defeating.	It	seems	more	beneficial	to	the	man	in	
these	circumstances	that	his	children	know	him	as	the	one	who	supports	the	
qualitative	care	of	their	mother	not	only	financially	but	through	cooperation.
A	second	reason	would	simply	be	 laziness	on	 the	part	of	 the	man	 to	make	
efforts	to	care	or	show	tenderness	and	affection	the	way	the	woman	does.	In	
fact,	in	many	African	cultures,	doing	so	is	the	woman’s	business	and	the	man	
who	acts	that	way	is	teased	as	behaving	as	a	woman.	Hence,	in	conformity	to	
social	expectations,	many	African	men	take	advantage	of	the	maternal	tender-
ness	and	affection	in	women	to	the	extent	that	they	harass	these	women	from	
engaging	in	any	other	human	activity	than	caring.	Hence	patriarchal	oppor-
tunism	results	in	a	sustained	attempt	by	men	to	prevent	African	women	from	
participating	in	activities	they	deem	remotely	connected	with	caring	such	as	
political	participation,	 employment	 and	entrepreneurship.	To	 illustrate,	 if	 a	
boss	finds	his	secretary	more	effective	in	his	duties	than	any	other	secretary	
he	has	ever	worked	with	and	for	 that	reason	refuses	 to	promote	or	 transfer	
him	to	other	positions	even	when	he	has	excellent	qualifications,	due	to	the	
fear	of	not	losing	him,	such	a	boss	becomes	opportunistic.	African	men	know	
they	cannot	excel	more	than	African	women	in	caring	for	human	society	in	
all	its	spheres.	They	are	also	quite	lazy	to	learn	from	women	on	how	to	care,	
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laziness	supported	and	encouraged	by	social	stereotyping	and	expectations.	
Hence	they	become	opportunistic	 toward	women	the	same	way	the	boss	 is	
opportunistic	toward	his	secretary.
How	can	this	unwarranted	men’s	opportunism	be	checked?	Can	the	reciproc-
ity	of	care	work?	It	is	not	possible	for	men	–	or	another	recipient	of	the	care	
of	women	–	to	reciprocate	in	equal	terms	the	care	and	tender	affection	they	
receive	from	women.	In	fact,	equal	reciprocity	of	care	between	two	persons	is	
neither	possible	nor	should	be	desired.	How	is	it	possible	for	an	elderly	man	
to	fully	reciprocate	the	care	he	receives	from	his	young	daughter	or	the	care	
a	dog	receives	from	its	owner,	or	the	loving	and	tender	care	and	affection	a	
young	boy	with	autism	receives	 from	his	mother?	These	scenarios	make	 it	
difficult	 to	 think	about	 the	possibility	of	equal	 reciprocity.	Even	 in	a	more	
balanced	situation	in	terms	of	persons	involved	in	care	relations,	it	is	still	not	
feasible.	Hence,	even	in	the	relationship	between	two	intimate	lovers,	it	is	not	
to	be	expected	that	one	equally	reciprocates	the	love	of	the	other.	Thus,	even	
if	African	men	wish	to	reciprocate	in	equal	terms	the	care	of	African	women,	
they	may	not	succeed,	and	this	may	lead	to	more	frustration	and	opportunistic	
tendencies.	 In	such	care	 relation	situation,	Barbara	H.	Andolsen,	 therefore,	
suggests	working	toward	mutuality	rather	than	reciprocity.	In	her	words:
“…	mutuality	 names	 a	 dimension	 that	we	 long	 for	 in	 relationships	 (…)	mutuality	 is	 a	 term	
that	denotes	 a	positive,	usually	 a	 loving,	 reciprocity.	Mutuality	 indicates	 a	pattern	of	 shared	
giving	and	receiving	of	good	things,	 including	intangibles	such	as	respect.	Feminist	ethicists	
have	examined	friendship	as	an	important	paradigm	of	mutuality.	Erotic	relationships,	properly	
constituted,	are	another	important	paradigm	(…)	mutuality	in	the	context	of	care	(…)	do[es]	not	
require	strict	equality	(…)	Mutuality	can	name	a	shared	commitment	to	remain	open	or	‘present’	
to	 one	 another	with	 all	 the	 other’s	 strengths	 and	weaknesses,	 even	when	 the	 two	 ‘partners’	
vulnerabilities	are	not	(at	least	roughly)	balanced.	Mutuality	must	not	only	enhance	and	deepen	
what	is	most	fully	human	in	each	party	to	a	relationship,	but	also	preserve	and	support	what	is	
human	when	it	is	threatened	by	physical	or	mental	decline.”26
In	this	context,	African	men	should,	therefore,	aim	toward	mutual	care	rela-
tions	with	African	women.	Even	when	the	care	received	from	African	women	
cannot	be	equally	reciprocated,	there	is	room	for	mutuality	through	such	ex-
pressions	 as	 appreciation	 for	 the	 care	of	women,	 support	 for	 their	dreams,	
sharing	the	burden	of	care	as	much	as	possible	and,	very	importantly,	by	not	
taking	advantage	of	the	care	of	women.
Conclusion
Care	is	a	“relational	value	lived	out	in	particular	relationships	set	within	spe-
cific	cultural,	social	and	economic	contexts”.27	Any	attempt	to	understand	care	
relations	outside	the	contexts	in	question	would	result	in	antinomies.	Hence	
to	question	or	criticize	African	women	(and	African	women	in	the	Diaspora)	
for	assuming	the	primary	role	of	caring	for	their	families	and	doing	virtually	
all	the	chores	needed	to	care	for	family	members	such	as	caring	for	the	baby,	
cooking,	shopping,	farming	and	the	like,	as	well	as	for	other	members	and	en-
tities	in	the	community	is	questionable.	These	women	do	not	see	themselves	
as	being	compelled	to	carry	out	these	duties	of	care.	For	them,	such	caregiv-
26
Barbara	 H.	Andolsen,	 “Justice,	 Gender	 and	
the	Frail	Elderly:	Reexamining	the	Ethics	of	
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9	(1993)	1,	pp.	127–145,	pp.	137–139.
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SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA	
65	(1/2018)	pp.	(165–177)
E.	Imafidon,	Is	the	African	Feminist	Moral	
Epistemology	of	Care	Fractured?176
ing	is	inherent	in	them	to	the	extent	that	it	defines	them	and	gives	their	lives	
meaning;	they	find	joy	and	fulfilment	in	doing	so.	They	are	naturally	disposed	
to,	and	emotionally	attached	to,	such	tenderness	and	affection	toward	others.	
To	be	sure,	like	in	every	other	human	relation,	the	African	women’s	caring	
nature	is	sometimes	abused	and	taken	for	granted	as	seen	in	patriarchal	op-
portunism.	But	to	advocate	that	African	women	do	away	with	the	disposition	
to	care	for	others,	particularly	the	family,	as	a	feminist	agenda	and	advocate	
that	men	do	exactly	what	women	do	in	terms	of	equal	reciprocity	is	to	impede	
the	choice	they	made	to	care	and	to	fracture	the	African	feminine	knowledge	
of	care	and	care	relations.
Elvis Imafidon
Je li afrička feministička moralna 
epistemologija skrbi razlomljena?
Sažetak
U ovom radu ispitujem do koje se mjere konkretno živo iskustvo i razumijevanje svijeta kod 
afričkih žena ozbiljno uzima u obzir posljednjih desetljeća u dominantno akademskim afričkim 
feminističkim diskursima, te usmjerava na njih. Argumentiram da je domorodačka (tradicional­
na) afričko­feministička perspektiva svijeta bila ponajviše razlomljena suptilnom feministič­
kom epistemološkom pozicijom određenom Zapadom, kolonijalizmom i teorijskom opresijom. 
Afrički feministi učeni su analizirati feminističke probleme na afričkom prostoru (domaćem i 
u dijaspori) upravo iz zapadnjačke, kolonijalne perspektive kao superiorne perspektive žen­
skog iskustva. Preispitujem tu činjenicu usmjeravajući se specifično na afričku domorodačku 
feminističku moralnu epistemologiju skrbi. Argumentiram da je suvremeni feministički diskurs 
razlomljen zapadnim i kolonijalnim pozicijama te da se uglavnom zanemaruje perspektiva tra­
dicionalne afričke žene. Dok se tradicionalna teorija znanja o skrbi afričke žene sastoji od 
njegovanja moralne dužnosti za brigom i uzdržavanjem ljudskog društva, suvremena afrička 
feministička pozicija takvu moralnu dužnost smatra opresivnom i diskriminacijskom za žene. 
S tim u vidu, mijenjam usmjerenost s pozicije afričkog feminizma pod utjecajem Zapada da 
bih ispitao problem patrijarhalnog oportunizma, problema koji možda još ne dobiva dovoljno 
pozornosti u traganju za zaštitom dostojanstva i dobrobiti afričke žene. Zaključujem da se ključ­
nim feminističkim problemima na afričkim prostorima, poput rasizma, kolonijalizma, društvene 
i ekonomske jednakosti i seksualnosti, treba pristupiti iz perspektive živog iskustva afričke žene, 
tako da bi se pojavilo autentično, nerazlomljeno znanje.
Ključne riječi
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Elvis Imafidon
Ist die afrikanische feministische 
moralische Epistemologie der Fürsorge zerbrochen?
Zusammenfassung
In dieser Arbeit untersuche ich, bis zu welchem Ausmaß konkrete lebende Erfahrung und kon­
kretes Weltverständnis afrikanischer Frauen in den letzten Jahrzehnten ernsthaft in Betracht 
gezogen – und ausgerichtet wird – in den dominant akademischen afrikanischen feministischen 
Diskursen Afrikas. Ich argumentiere, die indigene (traditionelle) afrikanisch­feministische 
Weltperspektive sei zum größten Teil durch die subtile, feministische, epistemologische Posi­
tion zerbrochen worden, die ihrerseits durch den Westen, den Kolonialismus und theoretische 
Unterdrückung festgelegt worden ist. Die afrikanischen Feministen sind geschult, feministische 
Probleme im Raum Afrikas (heimischen und in der Diaspora) eben aus westlicher, kolonialer 
Perspektive als überlegener Perspektive der Erfahrung von Frauen zu analysieren. Ich hinter­
frage diese Tatsache, indem ich mich spezifisch auf die afrikanische einheimische feministische 
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moralische Epistemologie der Fürsorge ausrichte. Ich argumentiere, der zeitgenössische femi­
nistische Diskurs sei durch westliche und koloniale Positionen zersplittert und die Perspektive 
der traditionellen afrikanischen Frau werde weitgehend vernachlässigt. Während die traditio­
nelle Theorie des Wissens um die Fürsorge der afrikanischen Frau darin besteht, eine mora­
lische Pflicht zur Fürsorglichkeit und Unterstützung der menschlichen Gesellschaft zu pflegen, 
hält die zeitgenössische afrikanische feministische Position eine solche moralische Pflicht für 
oppressiv und diskriminierend gegenüber Frauen. Dies in Erwägung gezogen, ändere ich die 
Ausrichtung von der Position des afrikanischen Feminismus unter dem Einfluss des Westens, um 
das Problem des patriarchalen Opportunismus zu ergründen, ein Problem, dem bei der Suche 
nach dem Schutz der Würde und dem Wohlergehen der afrikanischen Frau womöglich noch 
ungenügendes Augenmerk entgegengebracht wird. Ich komme zu dem Schluss, dass an die fe­
ministischen Schlüsselprobleme im afrikanischen Raum, wie Rassismus, Kolonialismus, soziale 
und wirtschaftliche Gleichheit und Sexualität, aus der Perspektive einer lebenden Erfahrung 
der afrikanischen Frau herangegangen werden muss, damit authentisches, unzerbrochenes Wis­
sen in Erscheinung tritt.
Schlüsselwörter
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Elvis Imafidon
L’épistémologie morale de la protection 
est-elle fragmentée au sein du féminisme africain ?
Résumé
Dans ce travail, j’interroge dans quelle mesure l’expérience concrète vivante et la compréhen­
sion du monde chez les femmes africaines sont sérieusement prises en compte au sein des dis­
cours académiques dominants du féminisme africain – et qui s’orientent vers ces discours. J’ar­
gumente en faveur du fait que la perspective afro­féministe indigène (traditionnelle) du monde a 
été fragmentée par une subtile position épistémologique féministe déterminée par l’Occident, le 
colonialisme et l’oppression théorique. Les féministes africains ont été conditionnés à analyser 
les problèmes liés au féminisme dans les zones africaines (autochtones mais également celles de 
la diaspora) à partir d’une perspective occidentale, perspective coloniale se présentant comme 
perspective supérieure rendant compte de l’expérience féminine. Je remets en question ce fait 
en me concentrant spécifiquement sur l’épistémologie féministe indigène de la morale et de la 
protection. Je démontre que le discours féministe contemporain a été fragmenté par l’Occident 
mais également par des positions coloniales, et qu’ainsi le point de vue des femmes africaines a 
été principalement ignorée. Alors que la théorie de la connaissance traditionnelle sur la protec­
tion des femmes africaines favorise les obligations morales visant à promulguer des soins et à 
contribuer à la subsistance de la communauté humaine, la position féministe africaine contem­
poraine considère une telle obligation morale oppressive et discriminante pour les femmes. En 
gardant cela en vue, je me distancie de la position africaine féministe qui est sous l’influence de 
l’Occident dans le but d’interroger le problème de l’opportunisme patriarcal africain, problème 
qui peut­être n’est pas suffisamment pris en considération dans la quête qui vise à protéger la 
dignité et le bien­être des femmes africaines. Je conclus en montrant que les problèmes­clés liés 
au féminisme dans les régions africaines, tels le racisme, le colonialisme, l’égalité sociale et 
économique et la sexualité, sont des questions qu’il faut aborder à partir d’une perspective qui 
met en avant l’expérience vivante des femmes africaines, de manière à ce qu’émerge un savoir 
authentique et non fragmenté.
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